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This article addresses the response of Colorado courts, and
that of certain other jurisdictions, to the 2004 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Crawford v. Washington.
On March 8, 2004, the U.S. Su-preme Court handed downCrawford v. Washington,1 signifi
cantly changing the landscape of hear-
say law. Crawford established a new
rule by which a certain category of hear-
say evidence offered against a criminal
defendant must be evaluated. "Testimo-
nial hearsay" was deemed inadmissible
unless the defendant had an opportuni-
ty to confront and cross-examine the de-
clarant at the time the statement was
made.
Since Crawford, virtually all state and
federal circuit courts have attempted to
delineate the precise boundaries of "tes-
timonial hearsay." This article, on the
two-year anniversary of the Court's de-
cision, provides an overview of many of
these cases, specifically focusing on Colo-
rado opinions.
Crawford v. Washington
The facts of Crawford were simple.
The defendant was on trial for stabbing
a man he believed had raped his wife.
He claimed self defense. The trial court
admitted a tape-recorded statement,
made by the defendant's wife to police of-
ficers, that undercut the defense. The
wife did not testify at trial because of the
marital privilege. 2
The U.S. Supreme Court used this set-
ting to re-evaluate the Sixth Amend-
ment right of an accused to confront his
or her accusers. The Court determined
that the primary object of the amend-
ment was to provide protection against
the improper admission of testimonial
statements.3 The Court held that when
"testimonial hearsay" is offered against
a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amend-
ment requires that the witness be un-
available to testify and that the defen-
dant had an opportunity for cross-exam-
ination at the time the statement was
made.
4
Because the Supreme Court provided
little guidance for the application of the
"new" rule, lower courts have been strug-
gling with the decision. Significantly, the
Court declined to explicitly define "testi-
monial hearsay," stating that it would in-
stead"leave for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial."',
History of the
Confrontation Clause
The Court's analysis of the history of
the Confrontation Clause was central to
its decision that the Sixth Amendment
required more protection than had been
provided by previous decisions. The
Court conducted a comprehensive re-
view of early English statutes, common
law, colonial practices, and early state
constitutions and decisions before con-
cluding that this historical record sup-
ported two propositions.6 First, it sup-
ported the proposition that the principal
evil addressed by the Confrontation
Clause was "the civil-law mode of crimi-
nal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused." 7 Second, this his-
tory supported the proposition that the
Framers would not have allowed the ad-
mission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial un-
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less the witness was unavailable to testify
and the defendant had a prior opportuni-
ty to cross-examine him or her.8
The central purpose of the Confronta-
tion Clause is to ensure that testimony in-
troduced against an accused is reliable. 9
Although there are many ways to ensure
reliability-most hearsay exceptions are
based on reliability grounds--Crawford
held that the Confrontation Clause re-
quires that reliability be established by
rigorous testing of the sort that occurs in
an adversary proceeding before a trier of
fact. 10 The American judicial system al-
ways has placed great value on cross ex-
amination as essential to determining the
truth of a matter. Crawford takes this a
step further and makes the opportunity to
cross-examine a precondition to the ad-
mission of certain types of hearsay state-
ments.
What is Testimonial Hearsay?
Dictionary definitions served as a start-
ing point for the Court when defining "tes-
timonial hearsay" that might offend the
Confrontation Clause. The Court defined
"testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of estab-
lishing or proving some fact."'" The Court
also drew a distinction between formal
statements (which might be testimonial
hearsay) and casual remarks (which gen-
erally would not be testimonial hearsay):
"An accuser who makes a formal state-
ment to government officers bears testi-
mony in a sense that a person who makes
a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not." 2
The Court then listed three possible for-
mulations of"testimonial hearsay":
1)"ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent-that is, mate-
rial such as affidavits, custodial ex-
aminations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-exam-
ine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably ex-
pect to be used prosecutorially";
2)"extrajudicial statements ... con-
tained in formalized testimonial ma-
terials, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions";
and
3) "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to be-
lieve that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial." 13
Although it did not explicitly adopt any of
these formulations, the Court noted that
they all "share a common nucleus." 14
The Court then provided examples of
statements that clearly are included with-
in any of these formulations, stating that
"at a minimum," testimonial hearsay in-
cludes prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, at a prior trial, or before a grand
Crawford was based on the federal Confrontation Clause, but counsel may object on both fed-
eral and state constitutional grounds. Courts generally will not assume that an objection is based
on both constitutions; if one constitutional ground is not raised, that issue Will be deemed waived
unless the reviewing court finds that it was plain error for the trial court to fail to consider it sua
sponte.'
As this article makes clear, Colorado opinions suggest that the state constitutional protection is
identical to the Sixth Amendment protection. However, it should be noted that the Colorado Con-
stitution uses different-and arguably stronger-language than the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him," and Article II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution guarantees the right of a defendant to
"meet the witnesses against him face to face." At least one court reviewing identical language in
another state constitution held that the language created a state constitutional protection greater
than that created by the federal Constitution. 2 This greater protection, however, did not result in
an expansion of the defendant's Crawford-type confrontation right.
A defendant's right to object on Confrontation Clause grounds also is limited by the continued
viability of the rule that defendants forfeit their constitutional right to confrontation with respect to
witnesses when their own behavior results in the witness's absence.3 This rule has been applied
by Colorado courts. In People v. Moore,4 the court of appeals refused to allow a defendant to
contest the introduction of excited utterances made by his wife when his own actions caused her
death and rendered her unavailable.5
1. United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2005).
2. State v. Malin, 2006 WL 120341 (Tenn. 2006).
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
4. People v. Moore, 117 R3d 1, 5 (Colo.App. 2004).
5. Id.
jury, as well as police interrogations. 5
However, even this list of core statements
has significant limitations. For example,
the Court specifically defined statements
made in police interrogations as testimo-
nial, but then stated that "Ulust as many
definitions of 'testimonial' exist, one can
imagine various definitions of'interroga-
tion.""6
When Does
Crawford Apply?
Before trying to make sense of these
definitions and lists, practitioners first
must ask: does Crawford even apply to
the situation at hand? Crawford does not
apply to all criminal proceedings, because
the Sixth Amendment right to confront
one's accusers is a trial right.' Colorado
courts have held that Crawford does not
apply to sentencing hearings,' suppres-
sion hearings, 19 or probation violation
hearings.20 Other state and federal courts
have held that there is no confrontation
right at, inter alia, preliminary hearings,
21
in camera hearings to determine why a
witness refused to answer a question,
22
and post-conviction relief proceedings.n
Practitioners also should question
Crawford's application when handling
cases decided before the Supreme Court's
opinion was issued. In Teague v. Lane,
2 4
the U.S. Supreme Court held that "new
constitutional riles of criminal procedure"
are not applicable in cases where the con-
viction was final before the new rule was
announced, unless the new rule is a "wa-
tershed" rule.25 The definition of a "water-
shed rule" is very narrow and requires the
rule to fulfill two criteria: (1) "[i]nfringe-
ment of the rule must seriously diminish
the likelihood of obtaining an accurate
conviction"; and (2) "the rule must alter
our understanding of the bedrock proce-
dural elements essential to the fairness of
a proceeding."26 Because the majority of
courts have concluded that Crawford an-
nounces a new rule, the struggle has been
over whether the new rule falls within the
"watershed" exception and should be ap-
plied retroactively.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held
that the Crawford rule does not apply to
cases involving convictions that became fi-
nal before the decision was announced."
Crawford does apply retroactively to cases
pending on direct appeal at the time the
decision was announced.2' Although a few
federal circuits have held that the Craw-
ford rule is a watershed rule and may be
applied to post-conviction review, specifi-
48 / The Colorado Lawyer / May 2006 / Vol. 35, No. 5
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cally habeas review, the Tenth Circuit
joins the majority of circuits holding that
it does not.'
Finally, counsel must remember that
Crawford does not apply if the declarant
also testifies at trial; if a witness testifies,
there is no Crawford issue. Cross exami-
nation of the witness at trial is sufficient
for Confrontation Clause purposes.30
Colorado's Analysis of
"Testimonial Hearsay"
The Colorado Court of Appeals has is-
sued a number of opinions since Craw-
ford, some of which are discussed below.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently is-
sued People v. Vigil,31 which provides a
comprehensive review and analysis of
Crawford.
Vigil was convicted of sexual assault on
a child. The trial court had ruled that the
child was unavailable and admitted state-
ments the child made (1) to his father and
to a friend of his father, which were
deemed admissible as excited utterances;
and (2) to a doctor, which were deemed
statements for the purposes of medical di-
agnosis and treatment. 32 The Colorado
Supreme Court held that these were not
testimonial hearsay.33 The Court also im-
plicitly adopted the court of appeals' con-
clusion that the child's statements to the
police were testimonial hearsay, but held
that the admission of those statements
was not plain error.34 In reaching these
conclusions, the Court created a two-part
analysis to determine whether state-
ments are "testimonial" for Crawford pur-
poses.
Vigil Analysis: Part I
First, the trial court should determine
whether the statements fall within one of
the four specific categories of testimonial
hearsay defined by Crawford:
1) statements made in the course of a
preliminary hearing;
2) statements made in front of a grand
jury;
3) statements made at a prior trial; and
4) statements made in the course of po-
lice interrogation. 35
If the statements fall within one of these
categories, the statements are testimoni-
al.
The child's statements to his father and
his father's friend clearly fall outside these
four categories. The child's statements to
the police clearly fall within the police in-
terrogation category. The defendant ar-
gued that the child's statement to the doc-
tor fell within the police interrogation cat-
egory because the doctor was part of a
child protection team, was engaging in a
sexual assault examination, and knew
that the child's statements would be used
by the prosecution. The Court acknowl-
edged that the police interrogation cate-
gory does not require the actual involve-
ment of the police; only the "functional
equivalent" of police interrogation is re-
quired.36 However, the Court rejected the
argument that the doctor's questioning
was the functional equivalent of police in-
terrogation in this case, noting that the
primary purpose of the doctor was to get
medical information, not to prepare testi-
mony for use by the prosecution. Without
a "more direct and controlling police pres-
ence" the Court held that the doctor
should not be deemed a government offi-
cialY.3 The Court also noted that the trial
court excised those portions of the child's
statements to the doctor that might be la-
beled "investigatory" and admitted only
those portions that were "diagnostic."38
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Vigil Analysis: Part H
The second half of the Vigil analysis
must be undertaken if the statements do
not fall within one of the four categories.
In that event, the trial court must deter-
mine whether the statements fall into one
of the three formulations of testimonial
hearsay that were set forth in Crawford.39
In VWil, this analysis involved an evalua-
tion of whether an objective witness
would reasonably believe that his or her
statement would be used later at trial; if
the witness so believed, the statements of
the witness are testimonial hearsay.40 The
defendant argued that "objective witness"
means "an objectively reasonable adult
observer trained in the law," but the Court
rejected this interpretation and ruled that
"objective witness" means an "objectively
reasonable person in the declarant's posi-
tion."
4 1
The Court used this interpretation to
analyze the child's statements to the doc-
tor, as well as the statements to the child's
father and his father's friend. With respect
to the statements to the doctor, the Court
noted that the child was a 7-year-old who
was interested in feeling better, who ex-
pected that his statements to the doctor
would help him feel better, and who would
not foresee that his statements would be
used at a trial. With respect to the state-
ments to the father and the father's
friend, the Court noted that the child
made these statements shortly after the
assault and was at home speaking infor-
mally to the two men. In the Court's esti-
mation, an objectively reasonable person
in the declarant's position-that is, an ob-
jectively reasonable child-would assume
that the men were interested in finding
out what happened, determining wheth-
er the child was hurt, and comforting the
child. There was no indication that the
child thought that these statements were
any sort of attempt to develop testimony
for trial. Accordingly, the Court ruled that
the statements to the doctor, to the father,
and to the father's friend were not testi-
monial hearsay.42
Having determined that these state-
ments did not run afoul of Crawford, the
Colorado Supreme Court also reviewed
the statements for admissibility under the
Colorado Confrontation Clause and deter-
mined them admissible under that stan-
dard, as well. People v. Dement 3 sets forth
the Colorado test and requires the prose-
cution to establish both that the witness
is unavailable and that the statement
bears sufficient indicia of reliability. Nei-
ther Crawford nor Vigil purports to alter
the manner in which this test is em-
ployed. A brief review of the Dement test
is provided in the accompanying sidebar
entitled "Practice Tip: Use Roberts Test for
Non-Testimonial Statements."
The Boundaries of
Testimonial Statements
Vigil, like Crawford, does not establish
the precise boundaries of "testimonial evi-
dence." The Colorado Court of Appeals has
addressed a number of specific fact situa-
tions and a discussion of those issues fol-
lows. Even though most of the cases were
decided before Vgil, a comparison of these
decisions with the Vigil analysis suggests
that the conclusions reached remain valid.
911 Calls
The Colorado Court of Appeals ad-
dressed statements made during 911 calls
and adopted a case-by-case analysis of
Prctc Tip Us Roet T s fo No -etmn S taeet
Even though Crawford eliminated the widely used Roberts testwith regard to testimonial hear-
say, the decision did not affect the use of that test when non-testimonial hearsay was at issue.' In
People v. Compan,2 the Colorado Supreme Court held that Roberts still applied with full force to
non-testimonial hearsay offered against the accused.3
Roberts requires courts addressing the admissibility of non-testimonial statements to deter-
mine whether the statements: (1) bear sufficient indicia of reliability by falling within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception"; or (2) were made by an unavailable declarant and bear "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."4 Colorado essentially adopted Roberts in People v. Dement 5
however, Dement did not explicitly abandon the unavailability requirement for statements falling
within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.6
1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
2. People v. Compan, 121 P.3d 876, 882 (Colo. 2005).
3. Id.
4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1983).
5. People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983).
6. Compan, supra note 2 at 885.
whether such statements are testimoni-
al.44 This analysis is used to assess the in-
tent of the caller-specifically, whether
the caller made the call for the purpose of
getting help or for the purpose of provid-
ing information for investigative purpos-
es.45 The court concluded that the state-
ment at issue was not testimonial because
"the caller was seeking immediate help
for the victim; the circumstances were ex-
igent; and the statement ... was neither
elicited by nor made to anybody with au-
thority."46 It is unlikely that this result
will be affected by Vigil, as Vigil also em-
ployed a case-by-case analysis that ulti-
mately focused on the objective intent of
the declarant.
Colorado's approach to 911 calls is con-
sistent with the majority ofjurisdictions
that have addressed this issue.47 Some of
these courts employ a case-by-case ap-
proach that limits the admission of state-
ments made during 911 calls to those
statements that qualify as excited utter-
ances. 4
Courts that have not adopted a case-by-
case approach to 911 calls have adopted
different per se rules. Some courts have
held that statements made in a 911 call
are never testimonial. The rationale of this
approach is that Confrontation Clause
concerns are not present, because the pur-
pose of the 911 call is "to obtain assis-
tance, not [to] make a record against
someone."49 Other courts have held that
all 911 calls are testimonial. These courts
reason that a declarant making a 911 call,
regardless of the circumstances surround-
ing it, should reasonably expect that the
statements will be used prosecutorially.50
This issue soon may be resolved. The
U.S. Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari in Davis v. Washington,51 a decision
that employed the case-by-case analysis of
911 calls that has been adopted by the
majority of other courts.
Excited Utterances
The Colorado Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue of an excited utterance
made to a friend of the declarant. In Corn-
pan v. People,5' the Court held that such
statements, at least in the factual context
presented, were non-testimonial, because
an objective person in the declarant's po-
sition would not think his or her informal
statements to a friend would be used at
trial.m
The Colorado Court of Appeals has ad-
dressed the more difficult issue of excited
utterances made to a police officer. In Peo-
ple v. King,5 the court adopted the case-
50 / The Colorado Lawyer / May 2006 / Vol. 35, No. 5
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by-case reasoning of other courts and held
that where the victim made an excited ut-
terance to a police officer in a non-custodi-
al setting without indicia of formality, the
statement was not testimonial. 55 Presum-
ably, the same analysis would be applied
to the statements of declarants who were
not crime victims.
In making this determination, the court
reviewed the formality of the statement
both with regard to the setting where it
was made and how it was elicited.56 It was
important to the court that the statement
was not made in a police station or given
in response to police interrogation. Addi-
tionally, the court reviewed the state of
mind of the declarant, noting that the
classification of a statement as an excited
utterance supported the conclusion that it
was non-testimonial. Because the victim
remained under the stress of excitement,
the court concluded that it was not rea-
sonable to believe that the declarant be-
lieved the statement would be used later
at trial.51 It is unlikely that this analysis
will be affected by Vigil, because this
analysis reviewed the question of whether
the statements were made as a result of
police interrogation, and also focused on
the objective intent of the declarant.
This case-by-case approach means that
practitioners must carefully evaluate the
facts surrounding the making of any ex-
cited utterances. The startling event giv-
ing rise to an excited utterance often di-
minishes a declarant's ability to recognize
the legal ramifications of the state-
ments-an awareness that otherwise
would render the statement testimonial.
To determine whether this concern has
been sufficiently addressed, some courts
evaluate whether a reasonable person in
the declarant's circumstances appreciat-
ed that the statements were being gath-
ered for trial and that the declarant had
the capacity to make a testimonial state-
ment.58 Other courts consider the intent
of both the declarant and listener.59
Courts that follow this approach reason
that even though the declarant of an ex-
cited utterance ordinarily will lack the
awareness that the statement may be
used for trial, the interrogating officer
may have this motivation.60
Not all courts use a case-by-case ap-
proach. Some courts have held that excit-
ed utterances are per se non-testimonial. 61
The rationale behind this approach is that
these statements are made in response to
the startling event, rather than in re-
sponse to interrogation or in anticipation
of trial.62 Other courts take a fumdamen-
tally different approach, disregarding the
excited nature of the statement and in-
stead focusing on the objective expecta-
tions of a witness in similar circum-
stances who is not excited.'
Other Statements to Police
No Colorado case directly addresses the
appropriate classification of other types of
statements made to police officers first re-
sponding to a crime scene. In Vigil, how-
ever, the Colorado Supreme Court indi-
cated that there is a presumption that
statements made to a police officer are
testimonial: "[o]rdinarily, if a law enforce-
ment official is involved during the course
of questioning, such questioning would be
considered a "police interrogation."64
There are at least three approaches that
have been taken by other state and federal
courts. One approach has been to classify
responses made to police questions as per
se non-testimonial. The rationale for this
approach is that the police are not gather-
ing the declarant's statements for use at
trial but rather simply to assess what has
happened at the crime scene.6
A second approach taken has been to
adopt a bright-line rule that all state-
ments made to police officers engaged in
the initial inquiry of what happened are
per se testimonial. The rationale is that
the police officer's involvement indicates
to the declarant that the statements will
be used prosecutorially.66
The most common approach seems to
be a case-by-case analysis of the specific
circumstances surrounding the interac-
tion between the declarant and police of-
ficer.67 Often, the analysis asks whether a
reasonable witness in the declarant's po-
sition would believe his or her statements
would be used at trial.68 Factors the courts
have considered include:
* the identity of the declarant
* why the declarant spoke to the police
" who initiated the exchange
" the location where the statements
were made
" the declarant's emotional state
* the officer's purpose in contacting the
declarant
" whether the statements were record-
ed.
6 9
Some courts have held that the intent of
the listener, the police officer in these cas-
es, is the most important consideration. 0
Practitioners should be aware that this
issue also may soon be resolved. The U.S.
Supreme Court recently granted certio-
rari in Hammon v. Indiana,7 1 a decision
that addressed the interplay between po-
lice interrogation and "testimonial hear-
say."
Statements by Children
The Vigil case involved a child's state-
ments to a doctor, to the child's father and
his father's friend, and to police. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court applied the previ-
ously described two-part analysis to de-
termine whether the child's statements
were admissible. The first step of the
analysis asks whether the statements fall
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within the four categories of testimonial
evidence defined by Crawford.72 The
child's statements to the police fell within
the police interrogation category and
were thus considered to be testimonial
hearsay. The child's statements to his fa-
ther, his father's friend, and the treating
doctor did not fall within any of the four
categories. The Court therefore employed
the second half of the analysis, which
asks whether the statements fall within
any of the three formulations of testimo-
nial hearsay described in Crawford-the
relevant formulation in Vigil was wheth-
er an objectively reasonable person in the
declarant's position would believe that his
or her statements would be used at a lat-
er trial.
Answering this inquiry requires an
analysis of both the extent to which gov-
ernment officials were involved in produc-
ing the statement and the purpose of the
questioning.73 When police are involved in
producing the statement, the government
involvement is great and it is likely that
the court will find that interrogation oc-
curred. 74 This is consistent with prior
Colorado decisions holding that video-
taped statements by child witnesses to po-
lice investigators in forensic interviews are
testimonial.75 Conversely, child witness
statements made to a parent or family
friend likely will not be testimonial.76 Most
courts have held that some governmental
involvement is required for the state-
ments to be classified as testimonial. 77
The analysis is more difficult when the
child's statements are made to doctors, so-
cial workers, or forensic interviewers, for
example, because these persons are not
automatically classified as government of-
ficials in the same way that police officers
are so classified. Vigil focused on whether
these individuals were acting as "agent[s]
of the police."78
To determine whether this type of in-
terviewer is acting as an agent of the po-
lice, the trial court should review the pur-
pose of the questioning. In Vigil, the Court
cited with approval decisions that state-
ments were testimonial, and therefore not
admissible, when the interviews by a non-
police officer were conducted to gather ev-
idence for trial.79 For example, a state-
ment to a social worker who was present
with a police officer and held the police re-
port in her hand as she questioned a child
has been deemed testimonial.80
To determine the understanding of an
objective person in a child's position, Colo-
rado courts engage in a case-by-case
analysis. Vigil provides a list of several
factors drawn from other cases. These fac-
tors include: (1) the declarant's age; (2) the
declarant's awareness of government in-
volvement; and (3) the declarant's aware-
ness that the defendant faces the possibil-
ity of criminal punishment.8 1
In reviewing these factors, courts have
looked at the presence or absence of state-
ments by the children indicating that they
understand the consequences of their re-
sponses to the questions.8 2 For example, a
child's response that a defendant should
"go to jail" indicated that the child under-
stood the statements would be used for
prosecution purposes, and the statements
were testimonial.8 3 The absence of any
such statements has been used as evi-
dence that the child did not have aware-
ness that the statements may be used lat-
er at trial.8 4 Courts also have considered
what the child has been told by the inter-
viewer. The fact that an interviewer indi-
cated that the child also would need to
talk to a "friend" of hers who worked at
the district attorney's office to put the de-
fendant in jail for a long time played a
part in the Court's decision that the state-
ments were testimonial.85
Courts often require that there be some
government presence before they will find
that the objective person in the child's po-
sition would know the statements will be
used for trial.8 6 Only a few courts have
recognized that children who make accu-
satory statements without the presence of
a government official may understand
that they are "essentially tattling."8
7
Other Statements
Statements made by a crime victim to
her training manager have been deemed
not testimonial in nature. The court of ap-
peals reasoned that the statements were
not made to police, and there was nothing
that indicated that the training manager
was acting as an agent of the police.8 This
reasoning is consistent with the analysis
subsequently adopted in Vigil.
Crawford itself specifically noted that it
does not apply to business records or co-
conspirator statements.89 The Court held
that these statements are not by "their
nature" testimonial.90 Since this opinion,
courts have struggled with what docu-
ments should be included within the busi-
ness record exception.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held
that public records are analogous to busi-
ness records and should not be considered
testimonial. 91 Further, the affidavits by
judges and court clerks that accompany
the public records-in this case, records of
prior convictions-do not implicate the
Sixth Amendment because their sole pur-
pose is to verify chain of custody and au-
thenticity, not to provide ex parte testimo-
ny 9
2
Other courts have applied similar rea-
soning to admit immigration records, 93
medical records,94 or certification records
for machines used to measure intoxication
levels.95 Even though it could be anticipat-
ed that some of these reports may be used
in court, they are non-testimonial because
they are used for foundational purposes,
not as substantive evidence of a particular
offense--evidence that would fall within
the Sixth Amendment's prohibition of evi-
dence "against" the defendant. 6
There has been some debate as to
whether laboratory reports should be ad-
mitted under a business records rationale.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that
Crawford does not apply to laboratory
and scientific reports.9 7 This approach also
has been followed in many other state
courts.98 However, other courts have de-
termined that laboratory reports are a
combination of testimonial (the report
writer's opinions) and non-testimonial
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(routine, factual, descriptive, and non-an-
alytical) statements.9 It has been argued
that these reports fit within the various
formulations of testimonial evidence
when they were prepared with the rea-
sonable expectation that they would be
used at trial.' 0
The classification of dying declarations
also is unsettled. Crawford acknowledged
that some dying declarations can be clas-
sified as testimonial statements, but stat-
ed that even these statements may be ad-
missible.10 1 The Court did not decide
whether the Sixth Amendment incorpo-
rated an exception for dying declara-
tions,10 2 but did recognize that the excep-
tion for dying declarations pre-dated the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment and
has been considered "a general rule of
criminal hearsay law." 10 3 Lower courts
have reached opposing conclusions on this
issue,1 4 and no Colorado court has ad-
dressed the issue.
Post-Crawford decisions have held that
statements made during plea allocutions
and in front of grand juries are testimom-
al.'0 5 In People v. Couillard,l 6 the Colo-
rado Court ofAppeals held that it was im-
proper for a court to take judicial notice of
statements made by the defendant's
cousin in a plea agreement to establish an
element of the crime charged against the
defendant.10 7 The court noted that Craw-
ford specifically referenced plea alloca-
tions as impermissible testimonial hear-
say. 108
The Colorado Supreme Court has ap-
plied Crawford to preliminary hearing
testimony, reasoning that the defendant's
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at
a preliminary hearing is restricted by the
limited purpose of such hearings o9 In the
absence of a full opportunity to cross-ex-
amine, such statements are barred by
Crawford.
Confrontation Clause violations are trial
errors. This means that a Crawford violation
does not automatically require a reversal;
instead the error is evaluated to determine
whether it was harmless.' For example, the
Colorado Supreme Court recently held that
the improper admission of a child's video-
taped statement did not constitute plain er-
ror because there was ample evidence for
the jury to find the defendant guilty of the
offense.2
1. People v. Fry, 92 R3d 970, 980 (Colo. 2004).
2. People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 930 (Colo. 2006).
Conclusion
Like any other two-year old, Crawford
is growing and changing. Although it is
possible that the U.S. Supreme Court
might impose significant changes on the
principles of Crawford, it seems more like-
ly that the basic contours of the rule will
remain the same, and that courts will con-
tinue to flesh out the precise boundaries
of the rule. Because new decisions are be-
ing issued on a weekly basis, counsel must
make sure to stay up-to-date in this area
of law before litigating the issues raised
by Crawford and its progeny
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